# Off

## Fw

#### Interpretation – affirmative teams should have to defend hypothetical implementation of topical plan that increases prohibitions of anti-competitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### 1—“Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

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At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade,” and Section 2 outlaws any “monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize”;1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”;2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### 2—“Prohibition” is a legal restriction.

Duhaime’s Law Dictionary N.D. –  Referred to by the Oxford University law library (Bodleian), School of Law, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, as a recommended research resource for law students (“Prohibition Definition”, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, <https://www.duhaime.org/Legal-Dictionary/Term/Prohibition>, No Date)

Prohibition Definition:

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### Violation – the aff doesn’t defend the end point of increasing prohibitions that expand the scope of core antitrust laws

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### 1---Fairness – the aff interp destroys it – not requiring a plan text decks stasis by allowing aff teams to change the 1AC throughout the debate, explodes the burden of negative research by unlimiting it to anything tangentially related to the resolution, and nullifies all topic-specific neg prep by forcing teams to rely on concessionary ground

#### 2---Truth Testing – only a topic with predictable limits produces clash-filled debates, which is the only internal link to any benefit debate can offer – rigorously testing positions allows debaters to improve their own advocacies and how to defend them, which creates more ethical and effective worldviews – but that becomes impossible without specific resolutional ties

#### The TVA is antitrust regarding Online Platforms to democratize facebook or ensure data portability. Platforms have the radical potential to open new possibilities of queer as an expectation. Eg seeing previously unknown queer gestures as known. Solves their lineage impacts and proves our model for debate doesn’t always trend towards straight time, solves their relationality and exclusion DA’s

#### This solves their offense as well as providing a locus point for the negative

Sy Simms et. Al (Department of Educational Policy Studies and Practice, College of Education, University of Arizona; with Z Nicolazzo [Department of Educational Policy Studies and Practice, College of Education, University of Arizona] & Alden Jones [Arlington, Texas]) 2021 [“Don’t Say Sorry, Do Better: Trans Students of Color, Disidentification, and Internet Futures” Journal of Diversity in Higher Education, [s. l.], 2021. DOI 10.1037/dhe0000337, loghry]

Moving from the physical to virtual realm, the internet has become a significant facet in cultivating social connection, fostering relationships with individuals across time, distance, and understanding (Clark et al., 2018). Queer and trans folks especially took to the internet as a way to build community and access information to things they might not be able to in real life. Early chat message boards and websites became places where trans people could access information about transition and try on new identities. For trans people in particular, online platforms like Tumblr (Cavalcante, 2019), YouTube (Chen, 2017), and Facebook groups (Miller, 2017) have become spaces where they could develop what Nicolazzo (2016a, 2017a) described as kinship networks, where trans people—and specifically for this study, trans students—can go to learn about their history, participate in conversations, and maintain their sense of safety in ways that might not be facilitated by participating in physical spaces. In thinking alongside Muñoz (2009) idea of queer utopias, the internet becomes a place imbued with the potential for TSOC to create and inhabit new worlds that subvert pain and violence from modern society. The internet then serves as a site to cultivate possibilities for existence, movement, and understanding; one worthy of further investigation to seek to what ends these possibilities could enhance or otherwise inform the work being done in physical LGBT centers on college campuses.

#### Framework has to be a voting issue – integrity of the game is a precondition for voting, and we’ve all implicitly agreed fairness is good by abiding by other norms like speech times and order – not voting for fairness causes judge biases which are worse

## Queer negativity

#### Any hint of positivity in queerness is nothing more than a site of society’s reproduction—positive queerness is always assimilated no matter how antagonistic—we must embrace total negativity.

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan)

Edelman’s project, insofar as we can imagine it as a starting point, is intriguing because for him queerness is fundamentally negative. Whether in the form of gay assimilation, identity politics, or ‘radical queer’ subculture, any contemporary engagement with queerness must reckon with decades of capitalist integration into society and its state. These varying forms are joined together through positive queer identity as a shared content. If we read Edelman with a great sense of catharsis, it is because his conception of negative queerness allows us to discard all the identitarian baggage which accompanies queerness. This move against a positive queer projects is a crucial one; it illustrates one truth about capital. Capital is predicated on accumulating value—any value—for its own self-reproduction. Capital is in a constant process of revolt against itself. Subjects which were once marginalized or annihilated by the civilized order are absorbed into its circuitry, positions that could mark an outside are moved inward. There is no positive queerness that isn’t already a site of society’s reproduction. The positivist institutions of queerness—its dance parties, community projects, activist groups, social networks, fashion, literature, art, festivals—form the material structure of civilization. Whatever antagonism or difference these forms possess is thoroughly re-made in capital’s image; all value extracted, all danger neutralized. To our horror, queerness becomes the avant-garde of marketplaces and the dynamic lifeblood of the advanced postmodern economy. This analysis of positivism is not particular to queerness. One can as easily point to any number of anarchist projects and expose the ways in which they reproduce the very alienation they aim to overcome. Cooperative business, radical commodities, independent media, social spaces, Food Not Bombs: when positive anarchist projects aren’t doing social work to stave off collapse or upheaval, they are developing the innovations (self-management, decentralized production, crowd-sourcing, social networking) that will help to extend capital’s reign into the next century. The departure from these forms is the elaboration of queerness in the negative. In this linking of queerness and negativity, we join Edelman, who defines queerness thus: [Q]ueerness, irreducibly linked to the “aberrant or atypical,” to what chafes against “normalization,” finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then, can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself. Put another way, we are not interested in a social project of queerness, in queer contributions to society, in carving out our own ghettos within the material and symbolic structures of capitalist life. Rather, our engagement with queer theory must be attuned to locating the moments which reveal the potential undoing of society, its structures and its relations. For Edelman, a theory of queer negativity begins from an exploration of the fantastic position of queers within society’s collective imaginary. His methodology is to navigate the discourses and nightmares of right-wing heteronormativity. Citing one fundamentalist pundit after another, he fleshes out the terror with which the anti-queer establishment imagines the threat of queerness. A thread persists through history into the present which imagines queers as the destroyers of social cohesion, the ‘gravediggers of society,’ the repudiation of the values of hard work and family, the persistent wave which erodes the bedrock of the monetary and libidinal economies, thieves, tricksters, hustlers, sinners, murderers, deviants, and perverts. Queers are not just damned, they are the proof of society’s fundamental damnation as well. Sodomites, after all, are named for their symbolic position as the sexual symbol of civilization’s decadence and imminent annihilation. Analyzing an example of this fantasy, Edelman writes: We might do well to consider this less as an instance of hyperbolic rant and more as a reminder of the disorientation that queer sexualities should entail: “acceptance or indifference to the homosexual movement will result in society’s destruction by allowing civil order to be redefined and by plummeting ourselves, our children and grandchildren into an age of godlessness. Indeed, the very foundation of Western Civilization is at stake.” Before the self-righteous bromides of liberal pluralism spill from our lips, before we supply once more the assurance that ours is another kind of love but a love like his nonetheless, before we piously invoke the litany of our glorious contributions to the civilizations of east and west alike, dare we pause for a moment to acknowledge that he might be right—or, more important, that he ought to be right: that queerness should and must destroy such notions of “civil order” through a rupturing of our foundational faith in the reproduction of futurity? Edelman’s desire for a queerness that would ~~hear~~ itself called a threat to the social order and takes this as a challenge rather than an insult is paralleled by the text “Criminal Intimacy,” authored by ‘a gang of criminal queers’ and published in the anarchist journal Total Destroy in 2009: The machinery of control has rendered our very existence illegal. We’ve endured the criminalization and crucifixion of our bodies, our sex, our unruly genders. Raids, witch-hunts, burnings at the stake. We’ve occupied the space of deviants, of whores, of perverts, and abominations. This culture has rendered us criminal, and of course, in turn, we’ve committed our lives to crime. In the criminalization of our pleasures, we’ve found the pleasure to be had in crime! In being outlawed for who we are, we’ve discovered that we are indeed fucking outlaws! Many blame queers for the decline of this society—we take pride in this. Some believe that we intend to shred-to-bits this civilization and it’s moral fabric—they couldn’t be more accurate. We’re often described as depraved, decadent and revolting—but oh, they ain’t seen nothing yet. This position of ownership of the negative means a liberatory conspiracy between the enemies of society. It allows us to escape the traps that lie in any attempt at affirming a positive counter-narrative. One cannot deny the destructive and anti-social potential of queerness without also affirming the social order. One cannot argue against the anti-queer paranoia which imagines us to be enemies of God and state and family without implicitly conceding the legitimacy of each. The hope for progressive notions of tolerance or combative activism to undo this fantasy is an expression of the desire for assimilation into society. Even ‘radical’ or ‘anti-assimilationist’ queer positions attempt to deny this negativity and to create space for queer representation in the State or queer belonging within capitalism. We’ll follow Edelman as he elaborates on this idea: Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, the ascription of negativity to the queer, we might… do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order—such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer—but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, or negativity into some determinate stance or “position” whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form… I do not intend to propose some “good” that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call “good,” can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic… [W]e might rather, figuratively cast our vote for “none of the above,” for the primacy of a constant “no” in response to the law of the symbolic, which would echo that law’s foundational act, its self-constituting negation.

#### Their emphasis on becoming can only ever lead to assimilation into capital—queerness as becoming negates the very negativity of queerness

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; <http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-musings-on-nothingness>) **modified for abliest language**

In other words, the demand of the economy is no longer that one simply conform or adapt, but even more that one takes upon oneself a dedication to the labor of becoming flexible, that one ~~see~~ it not as simply the necessary submission to a pressure exerted from outside but instead to act as if it would be ideal to no longer even be able to feel any externally-imposed force as such. To believe in oneself as the agent[18] of one’s own life, but to ~~see~~ [understand] oneself thus also as the agent of the control[19] of the same. In this world, the static individual is the sorry loser, the irrelevant nobody because the tides shift so rapidly that it is no longer a matter of steadfastly weathering the storm nor of hurrying to keep up with the latest fashions and trends, but in actuality a spiritual, metaphysical discipline of becoming so flexible as to become the waves themselves and be washed peacefully in the sea of society. Whenever the postmodernist speaks of becoming, not being, we must ask, “becoming what?” For, if postmodernity was birthed in the revolt of May ‘68, its maturation has been under the decades of punishment for such a transgression. And the answer will always be, in the end, becoming capital. The challenge is not to make a staunch appeal to the past forms of life but to critique those that arise today, to refuse to presuppose their awesomeness simply from their newness. In becoming there is always a gap between being-this and being-that. The affirmation of becoming as more fundamental than being (a la “nothing is static, that is mere myth; the essence cannot be frozen because everything is always mutable, so a thing is never itself and a being cannot identify since it will become other in the process; so becoming is primary and being is mere reduction to falsity…”), however, fills this space positively, or at least tries to incorporate an existential negativity[20] into the realm of the symbolic order, logical systems, and the functioning of the existent (which is no longer really the existent, but instead the scope of all becomings), negating its negativity by positing it as axiomatic[21] to the order of things (rather than as excluded as by the old logic-systems and ontologies), which are no longer understood as things nor necessarily ordered, but it would be absurd to expect this chiasmic flux to be anarchic when in fact it is founded upon the attempted incorporation of an ontological negativity into a system of ontological subjectivity.[22]

#### The only alternative is to annihilate every trace of this world, in every instance.

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan)

Again, a simple shift can apply this argument to the discursive and imaginary constructions of anarchists. Many anarchists find themselves compulsively responding to negative characterizations of our intentions and dispositions. In the face of an array of flattering accusations—we are criminal, nihilistic, violent, sowers of disorder—the proponents of a positive anarchism instinctively respond by insisting that we are motivated by the highest ideals (democracy, consensus, equality, justice), seek to create a better society, are non-violent, and believe anarchism to be the greatest order of all. Over and over again anarchists and other revolutionaries offer their allegiance to society by denying the reality or possibility of their enmity with the social order. Leftist notions of reform, progress, tolerance, and social justice always come up against the harsh reality that any progressive development can only mean a more sophisticated system of misery and exploitation; that tolerance means nothing; that justice is an impossibility. Activists, progressive and revolutionary alike, will always respond to our critique of the social order with a demand that we articulate some sort of alternative. Let us say once and for all that we have none to offer. Faced with the system’s seamless integration of all positive projects into itself, we can’t afford to affirm or posit any more alternatives for it to consume. Rather we must realize that our task is infinite, not because we have so much to build but because we have an entire world to destroy. Our daily life is so saturated and structured by capital that it is impossible to imagine a life worth living, except one of revolt. We understand destruction to be necessary, and we desire it in abundance. We have nothing to gain through shame or lack of confidence in these desires. There cannot be freedom in the shadow of prisons, there cannot be human community in the context of commodities, there cannot be self-determination under the reign of a state. This world—the police and armies that defend it, the institutions that constitute it, the architecture that gives it shape, the subjectivities that populate it, the apparatuses that administer its function, the schools that inscribe its ideology, the activism that franticly responds to its crises, the arteries of its circulation and flows, the commodities that define life within it, the communication networks that proliferate it, the information technology that surveils and records it—must be annihilated in every instance, all at once. To shy away from this task, to assure our enemies of our good intentions, is the most crass dishonesty. Anarchy, as with queerness, is most powerful in its negative form. Positive conceptions of these, when they are not simply a quiet acquiescence in the face of a sophisticated and evolving totality of domination, are hopelessly trapped in combat with the details of this totality on its own terms.

#### The potential for revolt is already there—embrace the persistent negativity of the death drive!

baedan 12 (baedan, 2012, “baedan,” authors’ manuscript, baedan — journal of queer nihilism — issue one; http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-baedan)

In No Future, Edelman appropriates and privileges a particular psychoanalytic concept: the death drive. In elaborating the relationship of “queer theory and the death drive” (the subtitle of No Future), he deploys the concept in order to name a force that isn’t specifically tied to queer identity. He argues that the death drive is a constant eruption of disorder from within the symbolic order itself. It is an unnameable and inarticulable tendency for any society to produce the contradictions and forces which can tear that society apart. To avoid getting trapped in Lacanian ideology, we should quickly depart from a purely psychoanalytic framework for understanding this drive. Marxism, to imagine it another way, assures us that a fundamental crisis within the capitalist mode of production guarantees that it will produce its own negation from within itself. Messianic traditions, likewise, hold fast to a faith that the messiah must emerge in the course of daily life to overthrow the horror of history. The most romantic elaborations of anarchism describe the inevitability that individuals will revolt against the banality and alienation of modern life. Cybernetic government operates on the understanding that the illusions of social peace contain a complex and unpredictable series of risks, catastrophes, contagions, events and upheavals to be managed. Each of these contains a kernel of truth, if perhaps in spite of their ideologies. The death drive names that permanent and irreducible element which has and will always produce revolt. Species being, queerness, chaos, willful revolt, the commune, rupture, the Idea, the wild, oppositional defiance disorder—we can give innumerable names to what escapes our ability to describe it. Each of these attempts to term the erratic negation intrinsic to society. Each comes close to theorizing the universal tendency that any civilization will produce its own undoing. Explosions of urban rioting, the prevalence of methods of piracy and expropriation, the hatred of work, gender dysphoria, the inexplicable rise in violent attacks against police officers, self-immolation, non-reproductive sexual practices, irrational sabotage, nihilistic hacker culture, lawless encampments which exist simply for themselves—the death drive is evidenced in each moment that exceeds the social order and begins to rip at its fabric. The symbolic deployment of queerness by the social order is always an attempt to identify the negativity of the death drive, to lock this chaotic potential up in the confines of this or that subjectivity. Foucault’s work is foundational to queer theory in part because of his argument that power must create and then classify antagonistic subjectivities so as to then annihilate any subversive potential within a social body. Homosexuals, gangsters, criminals, immigrants, welfare mothers, transsexuals, women, youth, terrorists, the black bloc, communists, extremists: power is always constructing and defining these antagonistic subjects which must be managed. When the smoke clears after a riot, the state and media apparatuses universally begin to locate such events within the logic of identity, freezing the fluidity of revolt into a handful of subject positions to be imprisoned, or, more sinisterly, organized. Progressivism, with its drive toward inclusion and assimilation, stakes its hope on the social viability of these subjects, on their ability to participate in the daily reproduction of society. In doing so, the ideology of progress functions to trap subversive potential within a particular subject, and then to solicit that subject’s self-repudiation of the danger which they’ve been constructed to represent. This move for social peace fails to eliminate the drive, because despite a whole range of determinisms, there is no subject which can solely and perfectly contain the potential for revolt. The simultaneous attempt at justice must also fail, because the integration of each successive subject position into normative relations necessitates the construction of the next Other to be disciplined or destroyed. Rather than a progressive project which aims to steadily eradicate an emergent chaos over time, our project, located at the threshold of Edelman’s work, bases itself upon the persistent negativity of the death drive. We choose not to establish a place for queers, thereby shifting the structural position of queerness to some other population. We identify with the negativity of the drive, and thereby perform a disidentification away from any identity to be represented or which can beg for rights. Following Edelman further: To figure the undoing of civil society, the death drive of the dominant order, is neither to be nor to become that drive; such a being is not the point. Rather, acceding to that figural position means recognizing and refusing the consequences of grounding reality in denial of that drive. As the death drive dissolves those congealments of identity that permit us to know and survive as ourselves, so the queer must insist on disturbing, on queering, social organization as such—on disturbing, and therefore on queering ourselves and our investment in such organization. For queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one. And so, when I argue, as I aim to do here, that the burden of queerness is to be located less in the assertion of an oppositional political identity than in opposition to politics as the governing fantasy of realizing identities, I am proposing no platform or position from which queer sexuality or any queer subject might finally and truly become itself, as if it could somehow manage thereby to achieve an essential queerness. I am suggesting instead that the efficacy of queerness, its real strategic value, lies in its resistance to a symbolic reality that only ever invests us as subjects insofar as we invest ourselves in it, clinging to its governing fictions, its persistent sublimations, as reality itself. This negative queerness severs us from any simple understanding of ourselves. More so, it severs us from any formulaic or easily-represented notions of what we need, what we desire, or what is to be done. Our queerness does not imagine a coherent self, and thus cannot agitate for any selves to find their place within civilization. The only queerness that queer sexuality could ever hope to achieve would exist in a total refusal of attempts at the symbolic integration of our sexuality into governing and market structures. This refusal of representation forecloses on any hope that we ever have in identity politics or positive identity projects. We decline the progressive faith in the ability for our bodies to be figured into the symbolic order. We decline the liberal assurance that everything will turn out right, if we just have faith. No, instead we mean to “unleash negativity against the coherence of any self-image, subjecting us to a moral law that evacuates the subject so as to locate it through and in that very act of evacuation, permitting the realization, thereby, of a freedom beyond the boundaries of any image or representation, a freedom that ultimately resides in nothing more than the capacity to advance into emptiness.” A non-identitarian, unrepresentable, unintelligible queer revolt will be purely negative, or it won’t be at all. In the same way, an insurrectionary anarchy must embrace the death drive against all the positivisms afforded by the world it opposes. If we hope to interrupt the ceaseless forward motion of capital and its state, we cannot rely on failed methods. Identity politics, platforms, formal organizations, subcultures, activist campaigns (each being either queer or anarchist) will always arrive at the dead ends of identity and representation. We must flee from these positivities, these models, to instead experiment with the undying negativity of the death drive. Edelman again: The death drive’s immortality, then refers to a persistent negation that offers assurance of nothing at all: neither identity, nor survival, nor any promise of the future. Instead, it insists both on and as the impossibility of Symbolic closure, the absence of any Other to affirm the Symbolic order’s truth and hence the illusory status of meaning as defense against the self-negating substance of jouissance… [Queerness] affirms a constant, eruptive jouissance that responds to the inarticulable real, to the impossibility of sexual rapport or of ever being able to signify the relation between the sexes. [Queerness] then, like the death drive, engages, by refusing, the normative stasis, the immobility, of sexuation… breaks down the mortifying structures that give us ourselves as selves and does so with all the force of the Real that such forms must fail to signify… the death drive both evades and undoes representation… the gravediggers of society [are] those who care nothing for the future. We’ll return soon to the concepts of futurity and of jouissance, but to conclude this point, we’ll assert that an insurrectionary process can only be an explosion of negativity against everything that dominates and exploits us, but also against everything that produces us as we are.

## Frame Subtraction

#### The affirmative affirms “new mappings of time.”- They choose to import a cartographic metaphor of “mapping” as a construct for thinking about time.

#### The use of “mapping” as a metaphor inherently brings with it a cultural baggage of governability and power that critical uses of the term can’t escape

Brennan-Horley 10, University of Wollongong (Chris, Creative city mapping: experimental applications of gis for cultural planning and auditing, <https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=4235&context=theses>

Cartography, GIS and the term ‘mapping’ itself brings with it a particular kind of cultural baggage. Maps remain a vital component of the western knowledge system traceable back to feudal times and have been used by state powers as mechanisms of knowledge production to constitute both subjects and territories as ‘governable’ (Wood 2002, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this tradition, territory is represented through conventions around co-ordinate systems, geo-coding and symbology, all of which Have carried through to the GIS realm. Despite cartography and western mappings being systematically unpacked by cultural geographers as tools for exerting power, they remain imbued with an unquestionable sense of objectiveness, masking other knowledge systems and ways of conveying information about places (Harley 1989, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this thesis, the perceived informational superiority of cartographic maps reproduced via GIS was repeatedly leveraged against as a means for effectively conveying research findings about the creative tropical city project (see section 1.6.1) to stakeholder audiences. These situations are discussed and elaborated in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

#### The baggage imported by the use of a spatial metaphor is that it functions to entrench a territitorialized understanding of space EVEN when it is used in fluid and critical ways

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At the turn of the 21st century, a quick browse through journals or bibliographical databases exposes the proliferation, in the humanities and social sciences, of titles that use the word “mapping.” The applications are varied and suggestive, but the following selection conveys the striking recurrence of this trope: China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom (2002) Cultures in Motion: Mapping Key Contacts and Their Imprints in World History (2001) Feminist Cyberscapes: Mapping Gendered Academic Spaces (1999) A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares (1999) Literature, Mapping, and The Politics of Space in Early Modern Britain (2001) Mapping African America: History, Narrative Formation, and the Production of Knowledge (1999) Mapping Canadian Cultural Space: Essays on Canadian Literature (2000) Mapping Jewish Identities (2000) Mapping Male Sexuality: Nineteenth-Century England (2000) Mapping Memories: Urdu Stories from India and Pakistan (1998) Mapping Modernities: Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe, 1920-2000 (2002) Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (2000) Mapping the Empty: Eight Artists and Nevada (1999) Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory (2001) Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (2001) Mapping the Sacred: Religion, Geography and Postcolonial Literatures (2001) Odysseys Home: Mapping African-Canadian Literature (2002) Orientations: Mapping Studies in the Asian Diaspora (2001) And last but not least: What Remains to be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race (1998) Even this selective list reveals a pervasive conjunction between the charting of space and the charting of knowledge, suggesting a link between the turn to spatial tropes and our increasingly globalized consciousness of the world. Yet oddly enough, while humanists and cultural critics have turned to the trope of mapping, geographers have been launching their most fundamental critiques of traditional cartographic practices. As Neil Smith and Cindi Katz point out, the discipline of geography was founded on assumptions of absolute space—“space as field or container, describable by a two-or three-dimensional metric of co-ordinates” (74). And the problem is that, although literary and cultural analyses increasingly recognize the fluidity, relationality, and multiplicity of the experiencing subject, the recent turn to geographic metaphor marks an uneasy gap between the destabilized subject and a discourse of spatial essentialism: “‘Space’ itself is rendered unproblematic, in startling contrast to the ‘everything flows’ of the social” (79). As Smith and Katz argue, since space itself is socially constructed and therefore as fluid and dynamic as the travelling subject, a slippage occurs between the material ground, or the “source domain,” and the metaphorical dimension, or the “target domain.” (69). Despite the multiplicity of locations being charted, the objective practices of surveying, circumscribing, and recording inscribe the notion of intellectual territorial mastery. Indeed, Smith and Katz speculate that it may be the extraordinary disruption and dispersion of previous knowledges and assumptions that occasions the turn to a non-problematized discourse: “space is largely exempted from such sceptical scrutiny precisely so it can be held constant to provide some semblance of order for an otherwise floating world of ideas” (80). Increasingly, however, the breakdown of absolute notions of space is transforming traditional cartographic practices. Despite Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra with its implication that “it is the map that engenders the territory” (166), it is equally true that new or previously unobserved spatial relations demand new strategies for mapping, with the boomerang effect that the new strategies in turn stimulate new spatial imaginings. Without denying Baudrillard’s insight that fabrication produces the observable real, we can also recognize the real as what intercedes in our fabricating, exposing the limitations of existing languages and stimulating reformulations of our fabrications. If globalization transforms the nature of spatial relations, then new mapping strategies are needed to depict those relations, and the strategies themselves will then prompt further reflection on the nature and conditions of our knowledge. To return, then, to the question of imaging globalization, we might describe the current predicament as one of employing a language inflected with territorialized constructions of space to express the complicated and shifting spatial dynamics of a deterritorialized globe. Again with recourse to geographers, we might say that an older, geopolitical language is being employed, with some hazards and difficulty, to track the complex processes of globalization. This distinction, I must emphasize, rests on a historical definition of the first term. Today “geopolitics” is often used to signify any locational approach to political issues or any political understanding of space, but the term as first introduced bore the specific connotation of location as territorially framed. Geopolitik was coined in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who—building on the work of German geographer Freidrich Ratzel—used the term to signify a Darwinian understanding of state power as dependent on territorial growth: stronger organisms survive by displacing the weaker. Although Kjellén’s theories had perhaps their greatest influence on the ideology that informed Nazi Germany, the geopolitical model is taken to be the dominant paradigm in the West until the end of the Cold War, fulfilling Halford Makinder’s prediction, in 1904, that the struggle for world power would focus on territorial control of Eurasia. As geographer Brian Blouet points out, geopolitics is a land-based ideology; it locates power in territorial magnitude and makes its goal the carving up of earth’s space. In contrast, Blouet identifies globalization as originally a maritime-based ideology deriving in large part from the Dutch; it offers an open rather than closed space paradigm, locating power in movement rather than bounded territory. It is important to note that the contrast is not one of bad geopolitics versus good globalization; both paradigms are subject to imperialist cooption. As Ian Baucom has recently shown, the Dutch seaborne empire was inherently imperialist; more immediately, although it may be helpful to describe the cartography of globalization as mapping fluidities, today even water threatens to become an article of imperialist control.2 But the geopolitical paradigm shifts to that of globalization as the world becomes increasingly based on the international or global circulation of capital, information, goods, and services, and the operative model shifts from bounded space to multi-directional flows.

#### It links explicitly to the aff and turns the aff—using the “mapping” metaphor for queer identities imports the baggage of cartography in ways that entrench state control and oppression

Walker 2000, Department of Geography University of Oregon, (Peter, Maps, metaphors, and meanings: boundary struggles and village forest use on private and state land in Malawi, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/352/walkerp032800.pdf?sequence=1

There is a current vogue in social and cultural theory for the use of spatial metaphors— for example, the 'blurring of boundaries' between reality and fiction in popular culture or the ‘mapping’ of alternative sexual identities. The popularity of spatial metaphors has spurred critical reappraisal of the need to bring actual places and spatiality back into social theory (Moore 1998), echoing an earlier emphasis in geography on the ‘social production of space’ (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1984; Smith 1984). In particular, a large literature on the 'politics of mapping' has 3 emerged that examines the ways maps are used as tools of political power (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Harley 1988; Kain and Baigent 1992; Mohanty 1991; Orlove 1991; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). As Peluso (1995) observes, mapping is an intrinsically political act that can facilitate largescale accumulation strategies that consolidate state control and work against the rights of local people.

#### Our Alt: We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:

#### One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.

#### Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.

Williams ’15 Douglas Williams is a third-generation organizer, He earned his BA in Political Science at the University of Minnesota at Morris and his MPA at the University of Missouri Columbia, where he was also a Thurgood Marshall Fellow and a Stanley Botner Fellow. He is currently a doctoral student in political science at Wayne State University in Detroit, where his research centers around public policy as it relates to disadvantaged communities and the labor movement. From the article: “The Dead End of Identity Politics” - From: The South Lawn - March 10, 2015 – Internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer, Purdue University. DeBoer holds a PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue and an MA in English, concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, Modified for potentially objectionable language. In one instance a capital “B” was adjusted to a lower case “b” in a manner that boosted readability, but did not alter context. https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” ----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer) Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and ~~see~~ one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice

#### Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the stances of the 1AC. All our links are net benefits to this Alt and it applies to other frames that we’ve critiqued.

# On

## James

#### The aff has already been controlled for by neoliberalism – their utopia is what keeps the free functioning of the neoliberal economy going

-this also provides a link buffer for any negativity arguments by saying Munoz isn’t negative enough

Robin James (Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy @ University of North Carolina) 2013 [“From “No Future” to “Delete Yourself (You Have No Chance to Win)”: Death, Queerness, and the Sound of Neoliberalism” Journal of Popular Music Studies, Volume 25, Issue 4, Pages 504–536, online @ <https://philarchive.org/archive/JAMFQF>, loghry]

The queer repetition, looping, and electric buzzing that, in classically liberal regimes, were illegible to hegemony, and thus opposites or alternatives to it, are, by the 1990s, registered as deviances that are always already controlled for. Specifically, they’re preprogrammed right into MIDI interfaces, VSTs, sequencers, samplers, and all sorts of other electronic music media. MIDIs (and other electronic instruments) give easy access to biopolitical death, in the form of both (i) the black/queer critical strategies of repetition, looping, and electronic buzzing, and (ii) the ability to use those strategies in ways that mimic biopolitical death.38 They give us access to intensities that are excessively high or excessively low, to what is illegible and imperceptible to neoliberal hegemony, and thus to what might appear to undermine hegemony’s attempts to manage it. However, as “MIDIjunkies” warns, this is only a faux subversion: it fucks you up, not hegemony. As Deleuze and Guattari argue in A Thousand Plateaus, drugs can induce a sort of faux subversion of neoliberal logics of intensity (in Deleuze’s terms, “control society”). According to them, getting fucked up on drugs mimics the experience of radical critique—what they call “deterritorialization.” Drugs “change perception,” altering its speed and intensity, and can thus reorganize epistemic and perceptual frameworks (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 282), making perceptible what was, in hegemonic regimes, imperceptible. Psychedelics do this, amphetamines do this, even alcohol and caffeine do this. However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that in drug use, “the deterritorializations remain relative” (Plateaus 285) because highs are finite and everybody comes down sometimes. Human physiology and drug chemistry are hard limits; drug use happens in “the context of relative thresholds that restrict” drug use to the “imitation” of deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 284). Drug addiction even further restricts the possibilities opened up by drug use: addicts go “down, instead of high . . . the causal line, creative line, or line of flight” opened by drug use “turns into a line of death and abolition” (Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus 285). In other words, drugs fuck up junkies, not hegemony; the trick is that hegemony convinces these “junkies” that their dejection is actually transgressive, even though it is carefully accounted for and managed. Junkies deviate in ways that are already standardized and accounted for. These losers fail in hegemony’s terms: as in a video game, losers might have shitty profiles full of losses and deficient in wins, but they still have a profile that the system tracks. “MIDIjunkies” treats MIDIs as drugs in the Deleuzoguattarian sense. MIDIs can be used in ways that make artists feel like they’re fucking shit up, subverting hegemony’s arche, but they do so in very carefully controlled and limited ways. One might think these electronic tools allow us to intensify repetition and noisiness beyond the limits of human perception or kinesthetic capacity. However, all hardware and software have limits: knobs only go up to 10, so to speak (and however you measure it, potentiometers do have mechanical and electrical limits). In Deleuzoguattarian terms, MIDIs make planes of consistency within a plane of organization (i.e., the technological and mechanical limits of the MIDI program, the potentiometers on the control devices, etc.). The most prominent example of this is the song’s use of apparently unmetered sound. To the casual listener, the last part of the song—about four minutes in, after the bass drops out and all that’s left are various treble synths—might appear to abandon the song’s solid 4/4 and veer off into nonmetric noodling (the same noodling, notably, that begins “Delete Yourself”). There is no regular bass or percussion pattern to follow, so casual listeners could easily loose the downbeat. This section seems to exemplify what Deleuze and Guattari call, “a liberation of time, Aion, a nonpulsed time for a floating music, as Boulez says, an electronic music in which forms give way to pure modifications of speed” (Plateaus 267, my emphasis). But these sections are not unmetered. The noodling still falls into four-bar phrases: every four bars, the musical motive changes slightly. The song itself is only superficially nonmetric. Moreover, most listeners were not casual—they were fervently dancing, pogoing up and down to the beat and keeping meter with their bodies (in lieu of the bass and percussion tracks doing it for them).39 This apparent foray into the nonmetric shows that what appears as unregulated improvisation is in fact possible only because of a very tightly managed foundation. Similar approaches are found in African American music. For example, in the Moonwalker (1988) version of Michael Jackson’s “Smooth Criminal,” there is a vocal breakdown that, to the casual listener, is composed of aleatory, nonmetric groans and moans. As the video’s staging shows, Jackson is in control throughout, carefully orchestrating what looks like unmanaged chaos (e.g., he keeps time by snapping his fingers or moving his body). As the music in “MIDIjunkies” shows, this apparent transgression of metric arche isn’t, in fact, a transgression. Drug-induced excesses are, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, ultimately faux deterritorializations, I think it is important to read “MIDIjunkies” through Deleuze, Guattari, and Bogue not only because ATR had explicit connections to Deleuzian thought (e.g., Empire’s involvement with Mille Plateaux records), but also because its critique of druggy, free-floating, meterless time clarifies one of the main limitations of Jose Esteban Muñoz’s concept of ecstatic queer utopianism. Muñoz theorizes ecstatic utopianism through both queer/punk performance and through comparisons to MDMA, once commonly referred to as ecstasy (“molly” is the preferred street name nowadays). For Muñoz, ecstasy—literally ek-stasis, excessive, ornamental, nonfunctional pleasure that transgresses the limitations of straight time and commodity capitalism— is both a critique of and alternative to Edelmanian negativity. Instead of the negation or rejection of the future, ecstasy is, as Muñoz explains via Marcuse (1974), “the liberation from time” (133), and specifically from the linear progressive rationality of “straight” capitalist time (as represented, for example, by Marcuse’s concept of the performance principle).40 Queer ecstasy is an excessiveness that works, like a drug, as “a surplus that pushes one off course, no longer able to contribute labor power at the proper tempo” (Muñoz 154). However, what both Deleuze and Guattari and “MIDIjunkies” demonstrate is that this druggy, irregular temporality is, in neoliberalism, decidedly not queer—it is the very measure of healthy deregulated economy (of capital, of desire) in which rigidly controlled background conditions generate increasingly eccentric foreground events. This deterritorialization is only relative; not even time is liberated because in neoliberalism, labor power is supposed to be offbeat and irregular.41 The real junkies here are the ones addicted to classically liberal concepts of death and resistance as negation—the ones who think “flowers in the dustbin” are actually oppositional, and not the compost fueling neoliberal biopower. Nonmetrical music is an-archic, and like the Pistols, treats death or negation in a classically liberal framework. Because neoliberalism always already co-opts death, randomness, and an-arche, these strategies do not challenge biopolitical hegemonies. Neoliberal regimes use biopolitical administration to regularize death; a normalized variable, death is not a form of distortion. The task, then, is to distort death. This is what happens on “Into the Death,” which hyper-intensifies biopolitical or metric regulation.

## Futurity good

#### Bailing on futurity's bad. They lock-in privilege and do violence to subjects. Futurity helps and doesn't ignore present struggles.

**Manalansan 15** (Martin F. Manalansan IV - Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who  is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory; "A Question from Bruno Latour" This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - <https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour>)

My response to the question of “no future” comes from my encounters, engagements, and conversations with colleagues under the aegis of queer-of-color critique, scholars like David Eng, Gayatri Gopinath, Roderick Ferguson, Chandan Reddy, and the late José Esteban Muñoz, among others. We appreciate the renegade antireproductive stance of the “no future” camp, which states that we should not subscribe to a future that is entrenched in heteropatriarchal dreams of marriage and procreation. However, there was a general sense among us that the issue of “no future” comes from a vantage point and a comfortable perch of privilege. As a scholar invested and immersed in the plight of queers of color, futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. To paraphrase my queer-of-color critique colleagues, we cannot not think of a future—it is the very fuel of existence, the pivot that animates and propels energies, performances, feelings, and other bodily capacities. The promise and peril of queer, both as a stance and as a field of study, is precisely in its anticipatory and hopeful dimensions. Queer is constituted by a yearning and a longing for something better than what is here right now. It is, as Muñoz would say, a horizon that we are drawn to and which is not yet here. Consider the group of undocumented immigrant queers of color in New York City whose lives I have been following for years. Dwelling in cramped domiciles and working in contingent jobs, there is very little to witness in their lives that suggests a kind of gay/lesbian triumphalism or the bright markers of the new normal. In fact, they live in precarious conditions but—a very important caveat—they live in moments that showcase fleeting gestures and images of fabulosity set amidst the squalor and mess of their lives. These moments, while fleeting, provide some way for them to think of another day, giving them a brief glimpse of a time and a place where there are sequined gowns, plush salons, and many sparkling things. While this might be called naïve hopefulness, thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo—to plant the seed for social transformation. In other words, there is a political potential to queer futurity. Or, to put it another way, we need to complicate and unravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance and to be open to the various alternative ways a future or futures can be imagined, particularly by those in the margins. Otherwise, we can all just pack our bags, go back home, put on some makeup, close the door, and hide under the bedcovers.

## State things

#### We can advocate for state action within queer temporality – conceptualizing the political capacity of futurity specifically in response to climate change is critical to displacing liberal subjectivity

Hall 14 (2014, Kim, Assxociate Professor of Philosophy Appalachian State University, “No Failure: Climate Change, Radical Hope, and Queer Crip Feminist Eco-Futures,” Radical Philosophy Review, Volume 17, number 1: 203–225)

In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive Lee Edelman proclaims that a future-oriented politics informed by a positive, hopeful conception of the future is necessarily opposed to and exclusionary of queerness. The future, according to Edelman, is “kid’s stuff,”16 that which is always anticipated in the name of the Child who “embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed.”17 In the name of this longed-for Child of the future, specifically in order to protect and promote the freedom of the imagined Child to come, the freedom of currently existing people is curtailed.18 Edelman’s contention is that present politics is oriented toward the good of the Child (or future generations) and that this future orientation of the political is the means by which heteronormative society defines and understands itself as good. In the context of this “reproductive futurity,” that which is queer can have no place because queerness disrupts efforts to secure the stability and longevity of the heteronormative family and society’s continuing existenceand identity in the figure of the Child. It is this desire for stability and preservation of “the same” in the future that Edelman rightly identifies as antithetical to the instability reflected in queer’s emphasis on becoming rather than being or fixed identity. Edelman defines queerness as that which “can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”19 Thus defined, queerness defies the notion that it is possible or even good to reproduce oneself and one’s society, that the future is a site for the reproduction of the present. As Edelman points out, the effect of invoking the Child in political discourse offers assurance that society as it is currently structured will continue to exist in perpetuity. This “insistence on sameness” is, Edelman points out, central to heteronormative (and I would add able-bodyminded) conceptions of the future.20 Following Edelman’s argument, queer theory must, in order to maintain its radical edge, reject the future, a concept inextricably caught up in a reproductive logic. In its refusal of identity, queerness cannot be assimilated into the heteronormative reproductive futurity that is central to the continuance of the identity of the social order into the future.21 Queer, in other words, names that which negates the future.22 Queerness refuses the “promise of futurity,” the promise of a future that will both resemble and be better than the present.23 The future, Edelman proclaims, has and is no place for queers. Edelman’s thinking on this topic can be extended to thinking about disability and the future. After all, while normalizing stories proclaim that things will “get better,”24 that the future will be brighter, there are no queers or crips in that brighter, better future; dominant conceptions of the future posit the future as a promise only for the able-bodied, hetero- and homonormative.25 As Alison Kafer explains, a compulsorily able-bodied society perceives disabled people as having no future and the future as devoid of disability. She writes, “If disability is conceptualized as a terrible unending tragedy, then any future that includes disability can only be a future to avoid. . . . In this framework, a future with disability is a future no one wants, and the figure of the disabled person, especially the disabled fetus or child, becomes the symbol of the undesired future.”26Edelman recommends a queer politics of resistance and refusal of all forms of “enslavement in the name of having a life,”27 and his association of queerness with a rejection and refusal of the future has become very influential in queer studies. However, some queer theorists28 have argued that Edelman’s universalizing concept of the Child is a concept that ignores the racialized, classed, gendered, and able-bodied networks that work to eliminate the future for poor people, people of color, and able-bodied people in the world. To be construed as having a life not worth living (i.e., as having a life unworthy of being continued into the future) means that one is not taken into account when plans for the future are made. For example, as Michael Berubé and Nancy Tuana contend, whether or not one survived Hurricane Katrina was not simply the result of living below or above sea level; it was also about being taken into account in the city’s planning for the future, being thought of as someone to consider in light of possible disasters.29 While critical of ableist conceptions of the future and sympathetic to Edelman’s rejection of the future as irredeemably heteronormative, Kafer disagrees with Edelman’s conclusion that queerness is necessarily a position against the future. Kafer rejects Edelman’s universalizing notion of the Child as incompatible with a queer and crip futurity and defends a feminist queer crip conception of the future. Along with José Muñoz and Jasbir Puar, Kafer points out that only privileged children in the world have been allowed futures. Puar writes, For queer politics, the challenge is not so much to refuse a future through the repudiation of reproductive futurity, . . . but to understand how the biopolitics of regenerative capacity already demarcate racialized and sexualized statistical population aggregates as those in decay, destined for no future, based not upon whether they can or cannot reproduce children but on what capacities they can an cannot regenerate and what kinds of assemblages they compel, repel, spur, deflate.30 For Kafer, Muñoz, and Puar, it is incumbent upon queer, feminist, and/or disability theorists to reimagine, not reject, the future. Such reimaginings are queer crip feminist to the extent that they understand the future as open and reflective of boundaries demarcating identities and entities in the present. In his discussion of the future, Robert McRuer maintains the necessity of queer and crip critique of incorporations of “difference” that are part of neoliberal visions of the future.31 Like Kafer and Puar, McRuer does not argue for a wholesale repudiation of the future; in fact, the possibility of queer crip futures informs his critique of neoliberalism.32 For McRuer, while reproductive futurity is unsustainable, alternative sustainable futures are both possible and necessary. He writes, [W]e might note that a range of critiques of capital . . . figure disability as the sign of capitalism gone awry while also conjuring up a naturalized ablebodiedness that should follow either its reform (for liberals) or eradication (for Marxists and other revolutionaries). Queer and crip reworkings of Marxism might more effectively speak to each other across their shared desire to not simply straighten that which is bent, and might thereby recognize the multiple locations where transnational crip/queer alliances function as sites for imagining a necessarily disabled world—meaning an inhabitable [my emphasis], sustainable, livable world.33 McRuer calls for queer and crip futures that remain open to the “disability to come,” an openness that renders “other futures” and “other worlds” more accessible to the diversity of real bodies and counter-hegemonic, non-normative lives.34 What are the implications of such discussions of the future for understanding and grappling with the realities of climate change? I want to build on McRuer’s and Puar’s respective calls for sustainability and posthumanism and consider in more detail the meaning of queerness and disability in relation to the nonhuman natural world. Queer crip feminist responsiveness to climate change requires more than understanding that the future isn’t only kid’s stuff; it requires, as Rosi Braidotti suggests, an understanding that as naturecultural beings humans are both “embodied and embedded.”35 From this perspective, boundaries drawn between nature and culture, human and nonhuman, able-bodied and disabled, etc. are, as Nancy Tuana puts it, “viscous” and “porous,”36 and identities, while embodied and located, are changing not stable, interactively emergent not innate, and contingent and provisional not eternal. As Braidotti makes clear, an openness to the future for emergent, interactive, naturecultural beings means an openness to the possibility of “a future without us,” by which she means a future that does not merely reproduce the past, a future made possible by a reconception of subjectivity and community.37 This conception of the future better reflects the natureculturalbeings we are and provides a more promising ground for queer crip feminist responsiveness to climate change. It takes seriously the anthropogenic nature of climate change and the fact that not all humans are equally responsible for climate change-related harms. It is crucial for the future to be rethought in nonanthropocentric ways in queer, disability, and feminist studies because only such a reconceived future will enable us to realize sustainable futures. Discussions of the future must take climate change into account because the present reality of climate change and the future climate change to which past and present emissions have committed the planet, are inextricably part of the context in which we are oriented toward the future. To speak of the future without taking into account this context is to put forward an empty concept of the future. In the absence of taking into account the earth/planet with which our lives are enmeshed, the concept of the future that informs queer theory’s temporal turn remains too anthropocentric to be responsive to climate change. Similarly, in speaking about disability studies, Alison Kafer observes, “the pervasiveness of the social model” in disability studies has prevented it from grappling with the nonhuman environment/nature; as a result, she contends, transformative coalitional possibilities between disability and environmental movements remain largely untapped.38 Here, I extend Kafer’s insight to think about climate change—there is untapped potential not only for coalitions between political movements but also for rethinking the centrality of the often all-too-human subject at the heart of queer, crip, and feminist studies. Before saying more about how a reconceptualized subject and future at the heart of a queer crip feminist response to climate change, I turn to another preoccupation in contemporary queer theory that begs interrogation: thinking of queerness as failure.

## Dillon

#### Their Dillon evidence is truncated before the completion of the paragraph. The omitted portion says state violence limits their ability to solve and their impacts are inevitable. Two impacts: 1) assign zero weight to this evidence for the aff 2) proves all our state engagement args on framework

Stephen Dillon (University of Minnesota) 2013 [““It’s here, it’s that time:” Race, queer futurity, and the temporality of violence in Born in Flames” Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory, 2013 Vol. 23, No. 1, 38–51, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0740770X.2013.786277>, loghry]

Franz Fanon’s concept of “historicity” is instructive here. For Fanon, the past is ontologically sutured to race so that when “I discovered my blackness … I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, slave-ships, and above all else, above all: ‘Sho’ good eatin’” (Fanon 1967, 112). For Fanon, white supremacy functions as a type of temporal prison where black liberation is delayed and destroyed by the capacity of past traumas, rooted in colonization and slavery, to affect, shape, and possess the present. Fanon looks to the past of European colonization and sees a mirror of the future, an “endless past/present of colonial domination” (Scott 2010, 76). In other words, white supremacy is not just a spatial technology that inhabits infrastructure and institutionality; it is also a temporal regime that refuses to abide by the progress of the law, language, or the passage of time.

**[UMN CARD ENDS HERE BEFORE THE PARAGRAPH ENDS – REMAINDER OF PARAGRAPH FOLLOWS]**

As Kara Keeling writes: “The past constricts the present so that the present is simply the reappearance of the past” (2007, 26). And as Isabel makes clear, state violence limits the possibilities of the present and future by binding both in a closed circuit of reverberation and magnification. When time accumulates, it possesses, detains, and immobilizes: this is time as a form of capture. In short, Isabel knows what is coming because it has already happened – in the past that is the future that has already arrived. There is not relief from knowing the past is gone because the past is a warning of what is coming. It’s going to happen again.

#### Dillon and Munoz are ideologically opposed- Dillon overemphasizes the present.

Jordan ‘14

12-17-2014 – Taryn D. Jordan is now at Emory University seeking a PhD in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies in Atlanta, Georgia. She recently completed her MA at Georgia State University where she defended her thesis. She openly identifies, in her words, as “a black queer lady”. Jordan served as a coordinator for TMOC – the “Trayvon Martin Organizing Committee”, which – amongst other things – organized the Trayvon Martin Protest and Rally in the West End Park in Atlanta, GA on July 14, 2013. “The Politics of Impossibility: CeCe McDonald and Trayvon Martin— the Bursting of Black Rage” – Thesis, Georgia State University, 2014. http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/wsi\_theses/43

Stephen Dillon’s article “It’s here, it’s time: Race Queer Futurity, and the Temporarily of violence in Born in Flames” describes his conception of a temporality of violence. Using Hortense Spillers work Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book he argues that time is not just an incremental process of counting of our lives—instead he frames it as an accumulation (Dillon 5). He uses the writings of George Jackson and Frantz Fanon on the realities of blackness to argue for an accumulation of violence through a relationship between the past and the present (Dillon 7-8). Dillon pushes back against Jose Esteban Muñoz’s queer utopias by arguing for an idea of time that holds in relationship the past and the present simultaneously thus rendering the reliance on the future in utopia useless (Dillon 5-6). He makes this provocative argument while analyzing the film Born in Flames, in which the revolutionary women’s army is insistent upon stopping the future. Dillon insists that to think of time fixing anything is a liberal progressive narrative because it will produce similar conditions of the past but in different forms (Dillon 4). Dillon finishes the article by saying all we have is the present, leaving one to ponder what that exactly will mean. My work is in direct conversation with Dillon; he is also using Fanon to think of the impossible of futurity for queer folks, however where we diverge is in our conceptions of time. I add to the conversation by expanding upon time as a accumulation, rendering the process of time as we know happening all at once, spiraling around all of us as we move through various realities and temporalities, meaning that past and present are indeed in relationship to each other, however the future is not just ahead of us; rather I posit that the future is now. Morgan Bassichis, Alexander Lee, and Dean Spade write, “To claim our legacy of beautiful impossibility is to begin practicing ways of being with one another and making movements that sustain all life on this planet without exception. It is to begin to speak what we have not yet had the words to wish for” (15). I do not see this quote as a definition of impossibility, instead it leads to what is to be expected when one dreams, thinks and conjures impossibility. It is the something that is on the edge of the tongue, the thing we have been waiting for, the social movement that will not allow us to leave anyone behind. I find the words of Bassichis, et al important because their intervention into impossibility draws upon the work of Afro Pessimist Scholars and charts a new path for Trans\* bodies and other non-black people to engage the spiraling relationship between impossibility and non-being. Alongside trans\* studies is theorist Lisa Marie Cacho, who does not necessarily use the language of impossibility; however, I see her theorization of socially dead subjectivities who must enact what she calls “unthinkable politics” as in line with my own work of framing what a politics of impossibly may be. Further, I build on the work of critical trans\* studies theorists like Stephen Dillon and Dean Spade to explore impossibility and its relationship to the larger LGBT movement. In her work, Lisa Marie Cacho explores the role of the socially dead subjectivity, which she defines as an individual who is juridically unintelligible to the state. Cacho frames the socially dead as bodies that are not assigned moral or social value, rendering them only intelligible through the crime, violence and immoral acts they commit (Cacho 4). In other words she is thinking through the way stereotypes of black, immigrant and terrorist subjects are deployed as people who are inheritably, “criminalized… prevented from being law-abiding,” their everyday tactics of survival are criminalized and constructing them not as law-abiding citizens and instead as criminals (Cacho 4). These socially dead bodies are then marked by their actions as well as the spaces they inhabit; space becomes a site of surveillance and naturalization of state violence. Cacho looks at othered spaces as one way socially dead subjectivities are mapped as failed subjects, “…people of color are represented as products of environments that are identified as the cause, rationale, and evidence not only for the populations’ inability to access political and economic equality but also for its vulnerability to state-sanctioned violence” (Cacho 72). She furthers this argument by walking through the way exclusion creates impossibility in relation to how bodies are created through space and racialization. She states, “…criminalization as both a disciplinary and regularizing process of devaluation does not just exclude some people from legal ‘universality’ but makes their inclusion a necessary impossibility” (Cacho 64). Clearly what is emerging is Cacho’s analysis of the exclusionary workings of social death through individual subjectivities and space. For my project I frame my analysis using Cacho’s definition of social death as a way to expand upon Spade et al’s transgender impossible politics. Similar to transgender folks, socially dead subjectivities are illegible to the state, and Cacho’s analysis of socially dead subjectivities provides a useful bridge between the two. Cacho’s conception of unthinkable politics, which she frames as a political project that works from the perspective of illegibility rather than as a fight for legibility or values-based arguments of socially dead subjectivities as valuable to society, provides a way of understanding what I mean by “non-beings.” For Cacho, unthinkable politics is in the decision to struggle rather than in the outcome of that struggle (Cacho 30). While I borrow from and build on Cacho’s framing of socially dead subjectivities and the spatialization of those bodies, along with her conception of unthinkable politics, I depart from her argument by shifting my analysis away from a solely legal frame. Cacho’s argument is limited due to its embeddedness within a logic of legality to conceptualize the value or lack of value for the socially dead subject. She is pointing towards the political potential of socially dead subjectivities towards what she calls unthinkable politics; however, similar to transgender theorists, she does not exactly expand upon what unthinkable politics could look like. My thinking of the politics of impossibility does not come out of a vacuum; at least two other scholars who are active in queer and transgender activist politics have been thinking closely about what it means to become comfortable with the possibilities of impossible demands. Stephen Dillon notes in his article “The Only Freedom I Can See” that freedom in terms of rights-based campaigns and policy platforms do not provide a pathway to a queer imaginable world, a world free from police and prisons (Dillon 182). He comes to this conclusion by exchanging letters between two different gender queer prisoners who are serving life in prison. Prisoner R notes that she finds her freedom after living in a solitary confinement cell through her physical death in a prison cell, “The only freedom I can see/Is Death in a prison cell” (Prisoner R 181). The impossibility of queer and transgender subjects in prison is based on the shift towards neoliberal politics by the LGBT movement, which is no longer interested in members of the community who are most affected by poverty, transphobia, and white supremacy. Instead LGBT politics became concerned with neoliberal economies of gay respectability, economic affluence and whiteness (Dillon 181). Thus, it ultimately left those queer and transgender bodies behind in the chase for marriage and military, two institutions steeped in neoliberalism. Gay marriage creates a hetronormative family that is legible to the state and capable of being self-sufficient, leaving out the need for state of federal social welfare. Militarism broadens the project of American imperialism by incorporating gay and lesbian bodies, once seen as abject, into the fold of the American dream. The focus on marriage and military has the effect of splitting the LGBT political base into those who are legible and those who are not. Dean Spade is also an activist and legal scholar who is interested in thinking though the potential of a politics based on impossibility. He, along with Morgan Bassichis and Alexander Lee in their article “Building an Abolitionist Trans and Queer Movement with Everything We’ve Got,” charts a variety of problems affecting poor and people of color (POC) gender queer and transgender people. I see their activist-focused manifesto as a way to think through the possibilities of impossibility, what they are demanding of us as activists and scholars is to think outside of the marriage and military fights put forward by mainstream LGBT movements (Bassichis, Lee, Spade 36). Instead they are interested in a politic that links to other struggles, seeks change that is focused on mass societal change verse policy-only strategies, that desires social transformation, and that attacks systems that affect queer POC and trans subjectivities the most. Taken together, these strategies urge us to become comfortable with politics that leaves no one behind, and think through how such a politic could be effective to all impossible bodies (Bassichis, Lee, and Spade 37). Both Dillon and Bassichis, et al situate their work as rooted in critiquing LGBT politics writ large. While this is a worthy fight, I aim to take their critique further and think through what an impossible politic might mean for all bodies that are marked by various dominations emerging from race, gender, class, sexuality, and ability.

## Munoz

#### Munoz politics fails – no strategy and contradictions

Feminist/Queer/Troublemaking, 2010 (5/8, Book Review: CRUISING UTOPIA: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by Jose Esteban Munoz, <http://blog.lib.umn.edu/puot0002/8190/2010/05/book-review-cruising-utopia-the-then-and-there-of-queer-futurity-by-jose-esteban-munoz.html>)

As is true with his last book, Disidentifications, Munoz masters the art of combining high-theory with performance and media criticism. His ability to blend Marxist analysis and postmodern theory is an example of utopian promise in and of itself. Throughout each showcase of performance artist or artifact, Munoz is fairly consistent in convincing us that there is a space for futurity in queer-world-making. However, his ideas start to become redundant and what we get from each artifact starts to blend toward the middle and end of the book. We are shown over and over that alternate spaces of queer world-making are possible, that memory informs the present that informs the future, that potentiality is greater than possibility, but not much else. Furthermore, his attempt to claim the political potency of each of his examples (from drag to public sex to Andy Warhol to LeRoi Jones) falls flat at times, especially in contradictory moments when it seems he believes in the importance of collective organizing, but then concedes to individual acts of everyday resistance.

#### Munoz is locked into urban utopia creation – means his politics excludes most queers

St. Pierre 2010 (Scott St. Pierre, Montgomery College, (09/01/2010), "Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by José Esteban Muñoz.", Journal of homosexuality (0091-8369), 57 (8), p. 1092. Accessed online via Wayne State Library, jj)

If there is any problem with the texts Muñoz selects it is that they almost exclusively share a metropolitan origin. Three sites function as spatial coordinates for the book: the suburbs of Miami of the author’s youth (briefly), Los Angeles, and New York City. If utopia might be a place, as Thomas More suggested long ago and as Muñoz speculates in his chapter on stages in clubs, is that space always an urban one? Muñoz protests that he does not mean to denigrate rural spaces, people, or places, but he mostly excludes them. Indeed, the figure of queerness that ends the book—the Brooklyn Bridge—could hardly be any more emblematic of the city and its (in some “liberal” circles) presumed superiority to the country. The absence of the rural here is made all the more obvious by the author’s defense that he does not mean to discount it, and one would like to see a fuller engagement with the worlds of other kinds of non-city-dwelling queers.

#### Present focus doesn’t lock us in but total abandonment of the present is politically counterproductive and turns their offense

St. Pierre, 10 (Scott St. Pierre, Montgomery College, (09/01/2010), "Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity by José Esteban Muñoz.", Journal of homosexuality (0091-8369), 57 (8), p. 1092. Accessed online via Wayne State Library, jj)

Instead, Muñoz embarks on a forward-looking project that relies heavily on the work of German Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, a surprising choice because Bloch is known not to have held especially progressive views on sexuality or gender. Yet, for Cruising Utopia, Bloch forms an important way of thinking about the future, particularly in his “critical notion of utopia” (p. 22). This is likely to be the most controversial aspect of the book, in which Muñoz defends himself from charges that the idea of utopia is naïve, provides a somewhat evasive apologia for not using traditionally empirical evidence, and attacks the agenda of many “mainstream” lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) people and organizations. Especially problematic here is the contemptuous way he treats advocates of samesex marriage and military service inclusion. While it is nothing new to argue that a genuinely progressive queer agenda is not wholly embodied in the search for just those civil rights, Muñoz goes even further to reject those “pragmatic” ideas outright. Queer people should not get married, he argues, nor should they want to serve in the military, for that would represent a surrender to “gay pragmatic organizing [which] is in direct opposition to the idealist thought that I associate as endemic to forward-dawning queerness” (p. 21). But if queerness is always yet to come, what are we supposed to do in the meantime? Is forward-looking enough for the underemployed lesbian woman with breast cancer but no health benefits because she can’t share her partner’s as a legal spouse? Is it enough for the transgendered teenage girl growing up in an abusive household who can find no other way to escape but to take advantage of the opportunities (economic, geographic, educational) offered to members of the military? One good response to my objection is to say that there are more just ways of ensuring access to adequate and affordable health care for all – universal, single-payer public health care, for example. And we might also suggest that there ought to be other sorts of publically funded opportunities for young people to have access to educational and economic advancement that do not include weapons or support for an imperialist U.S. agenda. But in the absence of such policies—and if recent debates about health care in the United States suggest anything—it seems unlikely those things will happen soon. Muñoz’s commitment to the future problematically chastises those for whom marriage or the military might literally be matters of life and death and very cavalierly offers only the plea that we “look beyond the pragmatic sphere of the here and now, the hollow nature of the present” and “imagin[e] a futurity” (p. 21). Those with a vested interest in thinking about the practical politics of the here and now (school anti-bullying or employment non-discrimination, for example, to identify two additional “pragmatic” topics Muñoz does not name) might find this work unhelpful or even counterproductive.

## Ballot

#### Ballot – The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.